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Abstract. This article investigates the fundamental factors influencing the rate and manner 
of Electoral participation with an economic model-based approach. In this study, the 
structural parameters affecting people's decision making are divided into two categories. 
The first category includes general topics such as economic and livelihood status, cultural 
factors and, also, psychological variables. In this section, given that voters are analyzed 
within the context of consumer behavior theory, inflation and unemployment are 
considered as the most important economic factors. The second group of factors focuses 
more on the type of voting, with emphasis on government performance. Since the 
incumbent government and its supportive voters are in a game with two Nash equilibrium, 
and also because the voters in most cases are retrospect, the government seeks to keep its 
position by a deliberate change in economic factors, especially inflation and unemployment 
rates. Finally, to better understand the issue, a hypothetical example is presented and 
analyzed in a developing country in the form of a state-owned populist employment plan. 
Keywords. Voters turnout, Behavioral economics, Bandwagon effect, Economic voters, 
Hyperbolic memory discount. 
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1. Introduction 
he election is one of the vital elements of democratic governance, and 
the most crucial component is the degree of citizen participation in 
the elections because there is such a belief that high turnout reflects 
the health of the democratic system (Robbins, 2010). Although a high level 
of turnout reflects the health of the democratic system, the decline in 
participation in the developed countries seems to be a threat to their 
democracy, and there is fear that elections as one of the necessary 
foundations of the democratic system lose its place especially in the public 
mind. As a result, governments will lose their popular support, and with 
the lack of cooperation and participation of citizens, they will find 
themselves virtually in crisis both domestically or internationally. The 
critical question is why in some societies, the political participation of 
citizens is high, but in others, it is not. More precisely, what is the 
difference in these societies that caused this difference in levels of citizen 
participation?  
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About 150 years ago, Scottish historian Alexander Tytler said about 
democracy, "The majority always votes for the candidate who promises 
more profits than the public treasury" (Tytler, 1840). This perception of how 
people behave in elections reflects the vital role which economic factors 
play in the type and quality of people's votes. After this point of view, 
many researchers called the person who follows the decision method 
mentioned aboveas "Economic Voters". However, this classification may 
not be particularly accurate because individuals usually consider several 
different factors in their decisions that would include economic and non-
economic factors. The crucial debate is how economic factors affect citizens' 
voting and decision making.The economic voters' thinking is based on the 
assumption that when the economic situation is better, the government will 
have more success in the election (Reidy et al., 2017). 
In today's world, most old democracies have faced the dilemma of 
diminishing citizen participation in elections. In Switzerland, for example, 
citizen participation has declined sharply since 1970 onwards, and now the 
average participation rateis around 40% (Lutz, 2007). Numerous studies 
have shown that Canadian youth turnout who born in the 1970s are about 
20 percent less likely to vote than their peers who born in 1945-59 (Blais et 
al., 2004). Similar studies also have shown the same problem in the United 
States. The following is a summary of the turnout rates in the U.S. 
presidential elections: 
 
Table 1. Turnout Rate in the U.S. Presidential Elections 
Year Turnout Rate 
(Percentage) 
Changes Respect to Previous Election 
(Percentage) 
2016 68.29 + 5.97 
2012 64.44 + 0.12 
2008 64.36 - 6.38 
2004 68.75 + 7.82 
2000 63.76 - 3.35 
1996 65.97 - 15.44 
1992 78.02 + 7.64 
1988 72.48 - 2.88 
1984 74.63 - 2.48 
1980 76.53 N.A. 
Source: International IDEA Institute. 
 
The table above shows the difference between the lowest and highest 
turnout rates in 10 presidential elections, was 14.26%, in which the lowest 
turnout belongs to 2000 and the highest one was in 1992. To determine why 
the participation rate in elections fluctuates, the understanding of how 
individuals make their decisions is essential. Therefore, in this study, we 
attempt to answer this fundamental question. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, some of the most 
important electoral studies, which the core focus of them are on the socio-
economic concepts, are reviewed. In section 3, the primary parameters 
affecting voter shave been discussed. Also, in section 4, the interaction 
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between eligible voters and the incumbent government is analyzed. 
Ultimately, in section 5, the conclusion is presented. 
 
2. Literature review 
This section outlines a few studies on how voters make decisions, 
focusing on economic issues. The reason for the low number of studies 
presented is because a large proportion of relevant and similar studies have 
been cited in other sections of the paper. It should be noted that this section 
is intended solely to provide the reader with a better understanding of the 
literature of this field, and further studies in this area are presented in other 
sections. 
Nezi (2012), by analysis several elections in Greece, concluded voters 
tend to punish the government in times of weak economic performance 
and vote for rival groups in the elections. Governments should also expect 
only the support from the side of their core voters at a time of deep 
economic crisis (The core voters are people who vote for non-economic 
reasons and psychologically or directly depend on the government). 
Killian (2008), in his study, reached the fact when people realize that 
their financial circumstances are lagging behind the national trend and the 
overall average of the community, their willingness to participate in the 
elections increases.  This exciting conclusion suggests that the overall 
impact of adverse economic conditions on individuals' decisions is far 
greater than favorable economic conditions. 
   Burden & Wichowsky (2014) also pointed out the asymmetry of 
people's behavior in the deal with economic conditions and stated that 
harsh economic conditions would increase election participation (for 
further discussion see: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Radcliff (1992), by analysis of the electoral process in several 
industrialized countries, found that adverse economic conditions could 
decline public participation, while the reverse is true for developing 
countries. Pacek et al. (2009) achieved similar results for developing 
countries of Eastern European as well. 
 
3. Voter decision making: General perspective 
In this section, the most important parameters which shape the voter's 
beliefs are discussed. It should be mentioned that the socio-economic 
parameters which are understandable by voters in their routing life just 
investigated in this session.  
 
3.1. Voter as a consumer 
The decision to vote generally does not seem to differ from other 
decisions that people make during their social lives (Lau & Redlawsk, 
2006). Since every individual willing to maximize its utility, Anthony 
Downs discussed the behavior of individuals in a general election by 
defining the voters as rational consumers; in his view, being rational means 
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that the individual seeks to satisfy his needs without concealing his 
interests. Moreover, the individual will stop his performance when he 
discovers a mistake in his action (Downs, 1957). Based on this definition, if 
the costs of participating in the elections outweigh its benefits, one would 
be reluctant to participate. So, for a potential voter, the utility of voting is 
calculated as follows: 
 
∆𝑈 = 𝑃𝐵 − 𝐶         (1) 
 
Which 𝑃  represents the probability that a vote can be decisive, 𝐵 
represents the gain of the individual candidate's victory, and 𝐶 represents 
the net cost incurred by the individual in the voting process. In practice, 
this survey leaves us with a deadlock, because in a general election, the 
number of people who eligible to participate will be substantial, so 𝑃 is 
close to zero. Therefore it always seems ∆𝑈 is negative, and virtually no 
people are willing to vote. To overcome this impasse, Riker & Ordeshook 
(1968), in their study, tried to resolve this problem by adding the parameter 
D as a civic duty. Furthermore, Uhlaner (1989), besides the civic duty, 
added the willing of supporting charismatic leaders or politicians in D. 
Also, Edlin et al., (2007) expanded the theory by separating voters into 
selfish and social. The process of this analysis is as follows: 
By dividing Factor 𝐵  into the personal income 𝐵𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓  , and the social 
income𝐵𝑠𝑜𝑐 , and 𝑁  be the effective population size, then the term 𝐵  is 
redefined as follows: 
 
𝐵𝑠𝑜𝑐+ 𝛼𝑁𝐵𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝐵         (2) 
 
Thus, 𝛼 as a moderating factor indicates that the benefits to other people 
is less important than the gain to the individual and, therefore, for the 
majority of individuals 𝛼 < 1. 
Now, if 𝛼 = 0 we will be a selfish voter and if 𝛼 > 0 then we will be a 
social voter. It should be noted that  𝛼 never will be negative. Obviously, 
the likelihood of a vote to being decisive is inversely related to the number 
of voters. So we redefine 𝑃 as follows: 
 
𝑃 =  𝐾 𝑛                         (3) 
 
Which 𝐾 represents the level of competitiveness of an election. In this 
definition, 𝐾 = 10 is an acceptable value for an election where the parties 
are close in a competition, and the lower the level of competition will 
accompany by the lower value of 𝐾. By substituting (3) in (1), we will have: 
 
∆𝑈 = 𝐾 𝑛  𝐵 − 𝐶 
 
By defining 𝑏 = 𝐵 𝑁  as expected profit per person: 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
M.R. Sarkandiz, 8(1), 2021, p.43-57. 
47 
47 
𝑏 =  𝛼𝐵𝑠𝑜𝑐 +  
1
𝑁 𝐵𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓         (4) 
 
We will also define 𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔  as the number of eligible voters and 𝑇 as voter 
turnout ratio, thus  𝑛 = 𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔 . 𝑇 
 
∆𝑈 =  𝐾 𝑁 𝑛   𝑏 − 𝐶 =  
𝐾 𝑁
 𝑇 𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔 
  𝑏 − 𝐶      (5) 
 
We know that if 𝑁 is large enough, then 𝑏 ≈ 𝛼𝐵𝑠𝑜𝑐 , so 𝑏 must be positive. 
We know from equation (1) that it is rational for a person to participate in 




 ∆U > 0      𝑖𝑓          𝐶 𝑏 <       (6) 
 
Given a statistical distribution for 𝐶 𝑏   among the population eligible to 
vote, we can examine the difference in the turnout in various elections. For 
minor elections 𝑏 will decrease and so 𝐶 𝑏  will increase. As a result, fewer 
people will be willing to vote. However, because the rate of participation 
has reduced, this is important for some rational people (marginal people) to 
enter the polls, so it expects that there will be a balance of participation 
(𝑇𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏 ). 
In the views mentioned above, voting only studies within the 
framework of microeconomics, and macroeconomic factors have not 
explicitly discussed. Besides, the impact of government activities on citizen 
participation has not accounted for, as well. The cost factor here is severely 
limited and covers some of the costs, including the cost of being in the 
voting queue, the cost of gathering information to select an ideal candidate, 
etc. While these costs are significant, however, it cannot explain how the 
increase and decrease in the inflation rate will affect turnout rates.  
We start with the fact that voting is just like other people's choices, and 
so the principle of maximizing utility function will be in place. The issue of 
maximizing consumer desirability is as follows: 
 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑋∈ 𝑅+𝑛   𝑈 𝑋            𝑠. 𝑡           𝑃. 𝑋 ≤ 𝑌                 (7) 
 
Where 𝑋 = (𝑥1 ,… , 𝑥𝑛) is a vector containing different quantities of all the 
commodities that one can chose in the bundle of its selection. Also 𝑃𝑖  
represents the price of commodity 𝑖and 𝑃 = (𝑝1 ,… , 𝑝𝑛) and Y represents 
income. Thus 𝑃. 𝑋 =   𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖  (Jehle & Reny, 2011). Therefore, the factors 
that influence a person's desirability are equal to the factors that include his 
or her limitation. Since 𝑃. 𝑋 ≤ 𝑌 then these factors will be the price of the 
commodities and the income level of the individual. 
   Let us look at prices. What factors make prices fluctuate? Obviously, 
inflation is a benchmark for changing prices, and it is also an index that the 
householders experience directly. Now, if inflation is positive, it means that 
prices have gone up, so people with a fixed budget will be less able to buy 
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the goods they want, and vice versa. As a result, positive inflation reduces 
people's utility. 
Now let us look at the revenue factor. In general, having a job creates 
income for people, so the threat of employment can lead to income loss. It 
is also clear that the lack of employment, will drastically reduce utility, and 
as a consequence of what society perceives directly, unemployment 
decreases their well-being. 
In summary, it can be stated that the two main factors that people are 
facing tangible and affect their desirability directly and profoundly are 
inflation and unemployment rates. In this regards, Lewis-Beck & Paldam 
(2000) on the impact of the economic situation on elections by review 
numerous studies deduced as follows: 
1) Economic changes account for about one-third of the changes in 
voting and election results. 
2) Voters react more to past events than to future expectations. In other 
words, they look to the past rather than the future. 
3) Inflation and unemployment are the most significant macroeconomic 
factors affecting the election. 
4) Voters have a short-term horizon. 
 
3.2. Cultural parameters 
One of the issues that can be addressed in the electoral field is the race or 
ethnicity of the candidates; for example, the presence of a black candidate, 
especially in the U.S. elections. Lublin & Tate (1995) showed turnout 
increases when a black candidate has placed on the candidate list. Also, 
Washington (2006) stated there is plausible evidence that black candidates 
in the United States are increasing election turnout. In some cases, this 
increase is because black voters have come out in support of black 
candidates, and other whites have come out in support of other candidates 
especially the pure white ones. A racial or linguistic ethnicity can increase 
the participation among the community from which a specific candidate is 
nominated. The extent to which black persons participated in U.S. elections 
under President Barack Obama, the below table may support this. 
 
Table 2. Blacks' Turnout in the U.S. Presidential Elections 
 Eligible Persons (Percentage) People Who Report Voting (million) 
Gender/Year Female Male Female Male 
2012 70.1 61.4 10.4 7.4 
2008 68.1 60.5 9.4 6.7 
2004 63.4 55.8 8.3 5.7 
1996 56.1 49.1 6.7 4.7 
1992 59.2 53.9 6.6 4.8 
1988 55.9 50.5 5.9 4.2 
1984 60.7 54.1 6.1 4.2 
Source: CAWP (2015). 
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In addition to race or color, the turnout in the local elections is 
undoubtedly lower than the national ones, and so the turnout for the 
congressional elections is lower than the presidential. 
 
Table 3. Voter Turnout in U.S. Elections by Congress and Presidential Elections 
Presidential Congressional 
Year Participation Rate Year Participation Rate 
2016 68.29 2014 42.50 
2012 64.44 2010 48.59 
2008 64.36 2006 47.52 
2004 68.75 2002 45.31 
2000 63.76 1998 51.55 
1996 65.97 1994 57.64 
1992 78.02 1990 56.03 
1988 72.48 1986 54.89 
1984 74.63 1982 61.10 
1980 76.53 1978 57.04 
Average  : 69.72 Average   : 52.22 
Source: International IDEA Institute  
 
3.3. Psychological factors 
The Bandwagon effect is a situation where a person cut off or raise his 
demand based on the demand of other people in the market (Leibenstein, 
1950). In other words, if the demand of the people in the market increases, 
he will increase his demand and vice versa. The interpretation of this rule 
in the electoral field is that voters are more vote for a candidate who is 
more likely to succeed in the election (Kiss & Simonovits, 2014). The effect 
of this phenomenon on the voting process has been generally demonstrated 
(Zech, 1975). However, what is the mechanism of this effect, and how does 
it affect the outcome of the vote? Many recent empirical studies have found 
acceptable evidence that this effect has increased participation rates in 
support of the significant candidate (see, for example, Klov & Winter, 2007; 
Grosser & Schram, 2010; Agranov et al., 2017). During the 2000 U.S. 
presidential election, the national media mistakenly declared that voting 
was over in Florida and that the Democratic Party had won in that state, 
while polling stations in some western areas were still receiving votes. In 
these areas, Lott (2005) recorded a sharp decline in the turnout of the 
Republican supporters over the Democrats following that misinformation 
(Grillo, 2017).  
Generally, a president who is chosen for a period may win the next run. 
This outcome is likely due to the Bandwagon effect and thus makes the 
current government's opponents less likely to vote and lead to lower 
turnout. Of course, this cannot be stated explicitly and requires further 
study and research because, in some countries and some periods, this is not 
a fixed process. In this regard, the tendency of the presidential election in 
the United States does not show the same trend, while we see this effect 
clearly in the presidential elections of Iran (except in 2009, when the 
massive social changes increased the turnout). 
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Table 4. Voter Turnout in the U.S. Presidential Elections by President 
Year Participation Rate President Turnout Change 
Between Two Periods 
2012 64.44 B. Obama Increase 
2008 64.36 
2004 68.75 G. W. Bush Increase 
2000 63.76 
1996 65.97 B. Clinton Decrease 
1992 78.02 
1984 74.63 R. Reagan Decrease 
1980 76.53 
Source: International IDEA Institute  
 
Table 5. Voter Turnout in Iran Presidential Elections by President 
Year Participation Rate President Turnout Change 
Between Two Periods 
1981 74.26 S. A. Khamenei Decrease 
1985 54.78 
1989 54.59 A. Rafsanjani Decrease 
1993 50.66 
1997 79.92 S. M. Khatami Decrease 
2001 66.77 
2005 62.84 M. Ahmadi Nejad Increase 
2009 84.83 
Source: Iran Election Headquarters 
 
It is clear that the number of votes cast in the first round is usually more 
than the number of votes cast in the second round, except for the period in 
which massive political, economic, or national changes happened (for 
instance, September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.). 
 
4. Government vs. voters 
Each citizen in the face of the incumbent government can show three 
behaviors includes: agree, disagree, or indifference. An indifferent person 
will not be willing to participate in the elections. Nevertheless, if the 
economic performance of the government is positive, the person who was 
the opposite of the government will lose its willingness to participate in the 
elections. If his/her economic condition gets worse than in the past, he/she 
will participate in the elections in opposition to the government. It is useful 
here to consider a well-known concept, the Bandwagon Effect because it 
can have a profound effect on the behavior of those who vote.  
Now, suppose the economic situation has improved, and it is time for 
the second round of the election. The incumbent government's behavior 
will subject to numerous cases. The government's priority is re-electing, so 
the government and its supporters are practically in a game. In any game, 
each side seeks to make the best move. On the other hand, we know that 
each game has at least one equilibrium known as Nash equilibrium in the 
game theory. The Nash equilibrium is the condition in which each player 
chooses a strategy that, concerning the other strategies, gives him/her the 
most revenue. Of course, in some games, there is more than one 
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equilibrium. Since neither side knows the strategy of the other, so the game 
will be simultaneous (Besanko & Braeutigam, 2014). The following is the 
game of the government and its supporters for the next round of elections 
if the economic conditions got improved: 
 
Table 6. The Confrontation between the Government and the Supporting Voters in the 
form of a Simultaneous Game 
Incumbent Government  











r Failure Victory  
-1 , 0 1 , 1 Participation 
0 , 0 2 , 1 Non-Participation 
 
This game has two Nash equilibria as follows: 
A) (Victory, Participation) that are most favored by the government and 
acceptable to the voter. 
B) (Victory, Non-Participation), which is most favored by the supportive 
voter and acceptable to the government. 
Therefore, the government makes its efforts to motivate supporters to 
participate in the elections, while supportive voters prefer that the 
government re-elect at no cost. This interplay explains much of the turnout 
rates in ageneral election. The more successful the government is in this 
game, the higher the participation rate, and vice versa. Therefore, first, the 
government will try foremost to make re-vote all who voted for him in the 
previous round, and second, attempt to reduce the votes of its rivals. 
However, the government's performance makes it even more likely that 
some people who did not want to participate or were indifferent to the 
government, motivated to participate in the election. 
We now review the tactics used by the government to increase the 
turnout. The first step of the government will be to reduce the direct cost of 
participating in the elections for all eligible voters. 
 
4.1. Direct costs reduction 
As mentioned earlier, voting is in the bundle of people's choices and 
situated among the consumer goods. Direct election costs include the cost 
of getting off of home or work to the polls, the cost of the stand in the 
voting queue (time cost), as well as the cost of gathering information to 
select the person from the visual, audio, and print media or being present 
at the site of advertising campaigns. Although decreasing these costs can 
lead to more people's willingness to participate in the elections, but 
eliminating all the direct costs cannot lead to full turnout. However, it is 
noteworthy that the establishment of various methods, including postal 
voting, electronic voting, and the provision of new services to people with 
disabilities, generally have a positive impact on voter turnout. For instance, 
Surveys show that the introduction of the postal voting system in 
Switzerland has increased citizen participation by about four percent 
(Luechinger et al., 2007). Similar effects have also been observed in other 
countries (Gronke et al., 2008). It should be noted that the impact of internet 
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voting on participation cannot be entirely ascertained because, in some 
areas, this method made increased, in some others made decreased, and for 
the rest of them, that was insignificant. Therefore, this will require further 
investigation (Germann & Serdult, 2017). 
Miller & Powell (2015) found in their survey of the relationship between 
disability and election participation, people with disabilities were less 
likely to vote than ordinary people and also found that people with 
disabilities were more inclined to vote by the mail. Therefore, establishing 
the appropriate conditions for them will reduce the direct costs of voting 
and will increase the likelihood of participating. 
It is clear, the efforts to reduce the cost of the participants can have a 
positive effect, but it cannot see as an essential factor in assessing the extent 
to which people participate in the political process. There are several other 
factors that each of them can somehow influence the turnout, although we 
reiterate that these factors alone cannot explain the rate of participation in 
an election, but together they will be able to explain the rate. 
 
4.2. Hyperbolic memory discount effect 
For the first time, Nordhaus (1975) stated the government by deliberate 
changes in macroeconomic indices, would encourage the citizens to vote 
again. 
In days leading the election-day, the government will pursue a policy 
that reduces the inflation rate, while a high unemployment rate would be a 
collateral outcome. Then, the unemployment rate begins to fall back to their 
optimum levels during the period and will shortly continue after the 
election, following the implementation of inflationary policies and the 
suspension of those policies. Once the government is re-elected, the trend 
will repeat, and unemployment will rise again as inflation drops. In this 
process, the government uses fiscal/budgetary policies as monetary 
policies. The Philips curve could illustrate the short-term trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment. Therefore, the behavior of the government 
merely moves the Phillips curve in the short run. 
The reason the government adopts this behavior is that it faces 
retrospect voters who are experienced macroeconomic indicators such as 
high unemployment and low inflation. Voters in this context are 
exponentially discounting their memory of problems arising from inflation 
and unemployment (Findley, 2015). For example, the government target 
inflation over unemployment rates and vice versa. 
 
4.3. Size of the government 
The size of the government and the number of people directly employed 
by the government has a significant relationship with the turnout. The 
government employees are more likely to vote in favor of the government 
because it has a direct relationship with their economic benefits. Also, 
when we consider these people as a voting bulk, we find out that their 
influence on the election is more prominent than their number (Bennett & 
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Orzechowski, 1983). To explain this phenomenon, Borcherding et al., (1977) 
defined the "voting power index" as follows: 
 
𝑃 =  1
1 +  
𝑉𝑁𝐵
𝑉𝐵
 (1 𝐺 − 1)
         (8) 
 
Which 𝑉𝐵  represents the participation rate of bureaucrats in the 
elections, 𝑉𝑁𝐵  represents the turnout rate of the non-bureaucrats and 𝐺 is 
the percentage of the total number of government employees in the labor 
market. 
Taking 𝑉𝐵 = 0.9 and 𝑉𝑁𝐵  = 0.5, Bush & Denzau (1977) showed that if 𝐺 = 
5%, their overall effect is 8%. If 𝐺 = 10% then their effect is 16% and if 𝐺 = 
40% then their effect will be 51%. Therefore, it can be seen how a minority 
can become the majority. In other words, bureaucrats have more power 
than they can count because they are always more likely to participate in 
elections than non-bureaucrats ones. Therefore, they constitute a higher 
proportion of voters (Corey & Garand, 2002). Therefore, the higher the 
number of government employees, the higher the turnout rate in favor of 
the incumbent government, which explains why governments are always 
reluctant to downsize. 
Looking at the process of development and economic growth in 
developed countries, we find that during the period, the size of the 
government has decreased and consequently the number of government 
employees has decreased over time, so this block and the voting group 
have declined sharply, so 𝑃 has gradually dropped. By using the theory of 
voting power index, one can deduce that one of the reasons for the decline 
in turnout rate in developed countries is the decrease in the volume and 
number of government employees. 
We have seen that increasing the number of government employees will 
lead to an increase in participation and it can be account as a chief factor in 
the government's re-election. So how can the government increase its staff? 
The first point is that the increase in staff should occur in the year 
leading up to the election. Second, since the plan cannot finance directly 
(the parliament usually will not allow such populist projects), the 
government provides resources by creating unpredictable and in some 
cases, illegal deficits. However, these resources will eventually have to be 
sorted out in some way, because if they are not settled, it will be possible to 
pursue justice through competent authorities. The government plan to 
overcome this budget deficit includes two feasible options which describe 
as follows. 
4.3.1. Post-election job cuts 
Suppose the government recruit new workers and fund the job position 
through a budget deficit, which equals to 𝑋. The employment contract is 
generally one-year and it will expire after the election. The new employees 
tend to extend their contracts for the next year, but the government's goal is 
to attract votes, with no willingness to pay after re-election. As a result, the 
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contracts will not be renewed in the first place. On the other hand, the 
government needs to apply a cost reduction policy to offset the financial 
cost of 𝑋. Therefore, the government has to cut off a number of its previous 
jobs, and consequently, the employee reduction will offset the cost of 𝑋. 
Besides, due to the effect of multiplication or multiplier, the budget deficit 
will exceed its original value, so assuming 𝑌 as the surplus. Hence, some 
jobs need to be eliminated again to offset the financial cost of 𝑌; therefore 
we will have several jobs eliminated, and this reduction is more than the 




Figure 1. The trend of the number of government employees in the recruitment plan to win 
the election 
 
Which 𝑡0  is starting time of employment plan, 𝑡1  represents time of 
victory in election, 𝑡2  non-renewal contracts, 𝑡3  represents the time of 
eliminate jobs to offset costs, and 𝑡4 represents the time of eliminate jobs to 
offset rising costs, and 𝑒1to 𝑒5 represent employment levels. 
4.3.2. Preservation of the created jobs even after election 
In this scenario, if the government willing to maintain the created jobs 
even after winning the election, one of the solutions would be to use the 
Ponzi Scheme. According to this method, the government issues bonds for 
the expenses incurred. As the government does not have the financial 
resources to pay for these financial securities, it will also issue new bonds 
to repay their interest and will repeat the process several times (Bartolini & 
Cottarelli, 1994). This process cannot go on like this. Because the issuance of 
multiple securities leads to an increase in interest rates and consequently 
will lead to a reduction in investment that can cause a financial crisis. 
Under these circumstances, the job reduction will occur in the non-
government section. 
In developing countries, the government can offset the mentioned deficit 
by adopting policies such as currency exchange or selling its assets. 
However, we know that financing from currency exchange will lead to 
market volatility, and the sale of assets also results in a reduction in 
government employees. Therefore, we can conclude that after the 
implementation of this plan, many job positions will be eliminated, either 
by the government or by the non-governmental sector. Of course, by 
supposing the hyperbolic memory discounting effect mentioned earlier, 
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this policy could work for the government and provide part of its votes for 
re-election. Finally, it is worth noting that this policy is not possible in 
countries where parliamentary or judiciary oversight is continuous and 
pragmatic. So, the government is required to be transparent. As a result, 
this plan maybe implemented in developing or underdeveloped countries. 
 
5. Concluding remark 
In this article, the role of economic factors that affectthe citizen's decision 
in a local or national election has been studied. Given that the electoral 
process needs to be analyzed in a socio-economic context, therefore, it is 
best to use a behavioral economics approach, since this approach has 
increased the flexibility by incorporating psychological parameters into 
economic models. The variables analyzed in this study are divided into two 
categories. The first category was related to the factors that generally affect 
voters (regardless of their voting type). Taking a theory-based approach to 
consumer behavior, we found that the most significant factors in voters' 
decision-making are inflation and unemployment rates. The second section 
was focused on the impact of government actions on citizens' electoral 
behavior. It has been found that we generally face voters who want to 
minimize their costs and tend to punish the government in severe 
economic conditions. In the case of historical processes, they also exhibit 
retrospective behavior. In the meantime, the government is seeking re-
election, as well as pro-government voters (if the country's economic 
situation is favorable) are seeking re-election of the government at the 
lowest individual cost. So the government and its supporters will enter into 
a game with two Nash equilibrium. 
Another key factor affecting the citizens'participation rate and also the 
government's re-election is the number of public employees (bureaucrats). 
Numerous studies have shown that the effectiveness of the government 
employees in determining the outcome of an election is higher than their 
number. This fact may explain why most governments resist structural 
downsizing and reducing their direct labor forces. Finally, by providing a 
hypothetical example in a developing country, the issue was further 
elaborated. The government plan is to hire many employees (nationwide) 
before the election. However, after the election, and in the event of re-
election, the government faces two scenarios of removing or extending the 
contract of newlyhired employees. The analysis of the consequences of the 
two scenarios showed that if either of these scenarios were implemented, 
the economic structure of the country and labor market would face 
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